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Abstract 
Spatial econometrics methods have been extensively applied to the analysis of decentralized fiscal 
policy-making in the past two decades, with most research focussing on the investigation of spatial 
patterns arising from various forms of competition among local authorities. This chapter first reviews 
the several contributions in the spatial analysis of local government data that have appeared since the 
publication of the first edition of the Handbook of Fiscal Federalism (2006) - over seventy fresh 
empirical works - with the aim of evaluating the advancements that have been made since then in the 
knowledge and understanding of interjurisdictional competition phenomena. The second part of the 
chapter discusses the impact on the empirical analysis of intergovernmental fiscal interaction of a 
number of recent econometric developments concerning the specification, estimation and interpretation 
of spatial models, and concludes with some remarks on the foreseeable developments in geografiscal 
federalism research. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the past two decades, public economists have increasingly employed spatial econometrics techniques 
to investigate the phenomenon of horizontal and vertical competition among governments in multi-
tiered public sector structures. The use of geographical concepts and methods in empirical work on 
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fiscal federalism - geografiscal federalism - is justified by the idea that space is an important aspect of 
multi-tiered fiscal arrangements, as witnessed by the plethora of theoretical work based on the two 
most prominent spatial concepts in public economics - Oates' decentralization theorem and the Tiebout 
sorting mechanism - as well as by the common finding that decentralized fiscal policies tend to exhibit 
positive spatial autocorrelation. 
As discussed in Revelli (2006), the mainstream view among applied public economists through the 
1990s and the early 2000s was that spatial econometrics provided powerful tools to identify substantive 
strategic interaction among decentralized decision-makers, and promised to be able to discriminate 
economically relevant processes of competition (substantive interaction) from the physiological 
correlation in local government budgetary data that is mechanically driven by purely geographical 
factors that have no behavioral significance (omitted variables in the empirical model). In addition, 
applied public economists have for over a decade set themselves the ambitious task of identifying the 
root cause of interaction, i.e., determining what kind of economic process is at work when local 
policies exhibit spatial autocorrelation: tax competition, yardstick competition, or benefit spillovers 
from decentralized provision of public services. 
In order to discriminate between true interaction arising from intergovernmental competition and non-
behavioral correlation due to omitted variables, and to identify the politico-economic process 
generating such interaction, applied public economists have conventionally gathered rich datasets on 
decentralized governments' policies and characteristics, and borrowed the standard spatial econometrics 
toolbox to specify and estimate models of decentralized fiscal policy-making. 
The typical empirical framework consists of three fundamental components, to which spatial 
considerations are added in a more or less ad hoc fashion: 
a) a policy variable of interest, say a vector of tax rates, expenditure levels or efficiency scores 
(denoted by it  from now on), that is observed in a cross-section i  1, . . . ,N  - more frequently in a 
repeated cross-section t  1, . . . ,T  - of local governments; 
b) a sensible, stylized, reduced-form economic model suggesting a vector of strictly exogenous 
variables x it  that can be thought to directly affect it  in a non-spatial framework, with the residual 
component of the policy variable it  being orthogonal to x it , Eit|xi1 ,xi2 , . . . ,xiT  0 : 
it  xit
   it   #   
          (1) 
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c) a set of additional exogenous variables Z that allow the researcher to model the linkages between 
pairs of jurisdictions i and j. The Z variables are typically related to the location of jurisdictions in 
space, such as spatial coordinates, and transformed into a spatial weights matrix that is conventionally 
termed W. 
The first step of the empirical approach consists in the estimation by standard linear methods of 
equation (1) and application of a number of well established tests on its residuals in order to ascertain 
whether a spatial approach is indeed required. What form the spatial process should be given, though, 
is the most challenging question that applied spatial econometricians need to answer (Pinkse and Slade, 
2010). In general, the problem consists in learning about the nature of a spatial function s such that: 
sD  s X Z  u   #   
         (2) 
 Where D is the NT  k1  k2  1  matrix containing the data, with (location, time) observations 
being stacked by year,   is the NT  1  vector of policy variables, X is the NT  k1  matrix of 
exogenous variables, Z is the NT  k2  matrix of locational attributes, and u is an NT  1  vector of 
independently and identically distributed errors. 
Clearly, the NT-dimensional function s can be estimated only by imposing a number of restrictions. 
The most common sets of restrictions imposed on (2) lead to fully parametric specifications that are 
highly parsimonious in that they typically model the entire spatial dependence structure by means of a 
single unknown parameter.2 This leads to the two prominent spatial specifications that have been 
widely employed by applied public economists, that is a first order spatial autoregressive model 
(SAR(1)) - also known as the spatial lag model - reported in equation (3) below, or a first order spatial 
autoregressive error process - or spatial error model - reported in (4): 
INT  W  X  u   #   
        (3) 
INT  W  X  u   #   
        (4) 
where:   and   are scalar coefficients capturing the nature of the respective spatial structure, with 
0    1  and 0    1 , W  IT  WN  is a block-diagonal, row-standardized matrix of non-
stochastic weights built on localities' spatial attributes Z, INT  and IT  index the identity matrices of sizes 
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NT and T respectively, and WN  wij , i, j  1, . . . ,N . According to the conventional and widely 
employed binary contiguity criterion and upon row-normalization, the link between localities i and j 
(w ij ) equals 
1
n i  if jurisdiction j is adjacent (say, shares a common border) to jurisdiction i, 0 otherwise, 
with n i  being the number of units being adjacent to (sharing borders with) unit i. The empirical models 
(2) and (3) can be estimated by a variety of methods relying either on the maximum likelihood 
principle if one is willing to make distributional assumptions on u, or on moment conditions arising 
from the hypothesis of strict exogeneity of X and its spatial transformations WX,W
2X, . . . .3 
Most of the literature presented in section 2 below follows variants of the above described modelling 
and estimation approach. As such, it constitutes a sort of first generation empirical fiscal competition 
literature. The second generation is just at its beginning, and is introduced and discussed in section 3 of 
the chapter: it tackles directly a number of issues that emerge when trying to identify the spatial 
function s, with the main objective of obtaining empirical evidence that can be attributed a causal 
interpretation. Some remarks on the foreseeable developments in geografiscal federalism research are 
contained in the concluding section 4. 
 
2. Literature review 2005- 
 
2.1 Tax competition 
 
The earliest empirical works on intergovernmental competition were for the most part motivated by the 
objective of quantifying the externalities and spillovers from decentralized expenditures on public 
services on neighboring governments.4 However, also due to the increasing degree of devolution of 
taxing power to local governments, the literature that followed during the late 1990s and early 2000s 
decisively turned its attention to various forms of tax competition, where the key objects of interest 
were local tax rates and their spatial patterns. Most of the empirical research that appeared in the most 
recent years has indeed continued in that direction by further investigating the determination process of 
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local tax rates in a spatial framework, and trying to discriminate between information-based yardstick 
competition and mobility-based Tiebout processes. 
While a variety of institutional set-ups and country data have been scrutinized, most works have relied 
on a common empirical approach based on applications of the spatial lag dependence model (spatial 
lag) on cross-sectional or panel data from European countries and US states. Amongst them, Allers and 
Elhorst (2005) use Dutch municipalities' panel data to test for yardstick competition, and find evidence 
of tax mimicking in unanticipated tax rate differentials using a two-regime spatial model based on 
political strength of local governments. Edmark and Agren (2008) rely on Swedish municipalities' 
panel data and aim at distinguishing between the two processes - yardstick versus tax competition - by 
using a reform of the central government grant system. Since the grant reform changed the criteria of 
tax base equalization of the Swedish municipalities, the idea is that any change in the degree of spatial 
interaction after the grant reform can be viewed as indirect evidence of altered incentives to tax 
competition for mobile bases. They then test two empirical implications descending from yardstick 
competition, namely that yardstick-type interaction should be expected to be stronger during election 
years and when the political majority is weak. Brülhart and Parchet (2010) investigate the reasons for 
the disappearance of inheritance taxes in Switzerland, and conclude that tax competition is unlikely to 
be responsible for it. Feld and Reulier (2009) use panel data to test for tax competition in Switzerland. 
They find significant positive spatial autocorrelation in cantons' income tax rates, with the correlation 
being particularly strong for the most mobile middle-income taxpayers. Delgado and Mayor (2010) and 
Delgado et al. (2011) test the tax competition hypothesis in Spain. Gerard et al. (2010) use a long panel 
dataset on Belgian municipalities and find evidence of interaction among close neighbors in the setting 
of the local surcharge on income tax, but not of the local surcharge on property tax. Moreover, they 
allow for interregional differences in spatial patterns using the fact that Belgian regions (Wallonia, 
Flanders and Brussels) differ on political, economic, linguistic and cultural dimensions, and find that 
the intensity of spatial interaction processes is higher within than between regions. Santolini (2008, 
2009) sets up a theoretical model where politicians mimic the fiscal policies of their peers (politicians 
from the same party) in order to advance platforms that are aligned with the party's ideology, and tests 
the mimicking hypothesis on cross-sectional data from the Italian region of Marche. The empirical 
evidence indeed suggests that municipalities controlled by ideologically similar governments tend to 
implement similar tax policies. Cassette et al. (2012) use a panel data set of municipalities in France 
and Germany along the Rhine Valley, thus exploiting the fact that local governments in the two 
countries can influence the overall tax burden of firms via different tax instruments. Finally, based on 
US state panel data for almost thirty years, Deskins and Hill (2010) document that the intensity of 
interstate fiscal interaction diminished over time. 
A number of works test simultaneously for horizontal and vertical fiscal externalities. Leprince at al. 
(2007) study business tax interactions in France and allow both for vertical (department-region) and 
horizontal (cross-departments) externalities. Using cross sectional data from 1995, they find that 
business tax competition among departments is a significant feature of the French multi-tiered business 
tax (taxe professionelle) system, whether or not vertical interactions are allowed for. Devereux et al. 
(2007) use US state panel data to test for competition in excise tax setting, and find evidence of 
horizontal competition for cigarette taxes, and vertical competition for gasoline taxes. Hoffer (2011) 
obtains similar results: he tests for vertical (state-federal) and horizontal (inter-state) competition in 
cigarette excise taxes using US state-level data 2000-2007, and finds that high incentives for interstate 
arbitrage (cross-border shopping) make states highly competitive and responsive horizontally, but not 
vertically. Lovenheim (2008) uses micro-data on cigarette consumption combined with geographic 
information on the location of consumers with respect to lower-price jurisdictions to estimate cigarette 
demand models that incorporate the decision of whether to smuggle cigarettes across states. Burge and 
Rogers (2011) investigate vertical and horizontal fiscal spillovers in local option sales taxes (LOST) - 
i.e., general retail sales taxes imposed in over 30 US states at the municipal or county level, where the 
proceeds are returned to the local jurisdiction of the purchase location. In particular, they use panel data 
for municipalities and counties in the US state of Oklahoma to show that the ability of municipal 
governments to control LOST revenues by varying their own tax rate is affected by both vertical and 
horizontal fiscal externalities. Similar results emerge in Wu and Hendrick (2009) based on Florida local 
governments' property tax data. 
Finally, other aspects of decentralized revenue raising efforts have been recently analyzed to uncover 
spatial patterns of competition. Allers and Hoeben (2010) and Rork (2009) test for competition in the 
setting of unit-based garbage pricing and toll revenues respectively. Brown and Rork (2005) and 
Knight and Schiff (2010) investigate the spatial patterns created by US state lotteries. The former test 
whether the implicit tax (the amount of sales collected but not redistributed as prizes) is correlated 
across states, and find that if neighboring states lower their lottery tax, the home state responds by 
lowering it too. The latter find significant evidence of cross-border lottery shopping leading to 
competitive pressure from neighboring states. 
 
2.2 Laboratory federalism: discrete adoption choices in space 
 
Spry (2005), Ashworth et al. (2006), Rincke (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009), Fiva and Rattso (2007), Hall 
and Ross (2010), Sjoquist et al. (2007) and Burge and Piper (2012) turn their attention to local 
governments' discrete, binary choices about the introduction of novel forms of taxation or public 
service organization, and investigate whether those choices are affected by neighboring authorities' 
behavior. 
In particular, Spry (2005) addresses the questions of what determines whether a local government 
adopts an income tax and the percentage of the local revenue that is raised from the income tax. He 
uses data on the Ohio school district income tax (SDIT) - a local income tax that school districts can 
levy on the Ohio adjusted gross income of residents - and estimates a probit model and a Tobit model 
to answer those questions, finding evidence that fiscal competition for mobile consumers (proxied by 
the number of nearby school districts within a given distance) limits the ability of local governments to 
use a local income tax. In a related paper, Hall and Ross (2010) use a spatial autoregressive probit 
model to test on over 600 Ohio school districts if the likelihood of a school district adopting the income 
tax is a function of whether a district's neighbors have adopted the tax. In order to control for the 
potential bias due to spatially dependent omitted variables in a cross-section, they implement a spatial 
Durbin probit by Bayesian methods, that is a model where the propensity of a school district to adopt 
the income tax is a function of neighboring districts' propensities to adopt it as well as those districts' 
characteristics. They find evidence of significant spillovers, in the sense that the probability of passing 
an income tax is higher in school districts whose neighbors already use the income tax. 
Policy diffusion, incentives to emulate and yardstick competition between school districts in the US are 
deeply scrutinized by Rincke (2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2009), who consistently shows that policy 
innovation in school districts (inter-district choice programs, open enrollment schemes, charter schools) 
exhibits a spatial pattern that is best analyzed by means of spatial limited (discrete) dependent variable 
models. On the other hand, Sjoquist et al. (2007) and Burge and Piper (2012) investigate the 
determinants of local option sales taxes adoption in Georgia and in Oklahoma respectively. They model 
option sales tax adoption with a duration approach, where the time to adoption is allowed to be 
influenced by neighboring counties' adoptions. Estimation of discrete time hazard models reveals that 
in both states local governments are likely to adopt sales tax programs earlier if their neighbors have 
also done so. 
As far as Europe is concerned, Fiva and Rattso (2007) consider the choice of whether having 
residential property taxation by local governments in Norway. They employ a Bayesian approach to 
tackle simultaneous spatial dependence in the binary decision variable, and implement it on a cross-
section of Norwegian local government data, finding evidence of fiscal competition that, with limited 
mobility of the tax base and politically highly visible decisions, they interpret as compatible with 
yardstick competition. Ashworth et al. (2006) analyze the determinants of the diffusion process of the 
adoption of a green tax in Belgium: using panel data for the 308 Flemish municipalities for the period 
1991-1999, they estimate a discrete hazard model where the probability of a municipality introducing a 
green tax is allowed to depend on the percentage of first-order as well as second-order neighboring 
municipalities that have already adopted the tax in the previous period, finding that both variables have 
a positive effect. Moreover, the decisions of ideological neighbors - i.e., authorities that are close in 
terms of political affiliation - are found to have a similar impact, irrespective of geographical 
proximity. 
 
2.3 Spatial interaction with tax limits 
 
Some recent research has investigated the consequences of tax and expenditure limitations (TELs) on 
the spatial pattern of local fiscal policies. Explicit incorporation of TELs in the specification and 
estimation of fiscal reaction functions is justified by the observation that local governments around the 
world are frequently subject to stringent regulations on their tax and spending decisions. This makes 
the ideal paradigm of unleashed intergovernmental competition sort of blurred in practice. In fact, local 
tax rate limitations are observed almost everywhere. In the US states, property tax limits date back as 
early as the 1930s, and became widespread after California's Proposition 13 in the late 1970s. In 
Europe, local tax limitations are in place in virtually all countries, most frequently including all main 
local sources of own revenue - property, business and consumption taxes. A frequently encountered 
case is a cap on a local tax policy, ideally calling for a corner solution model accounting for clustering 
at the limit. Overlooking the fact that a number of local authorities might be constrained is bound to 
lead to similar problems as the ones that are encountered  in non-spatial econometric settings when the 
dependent variable is limited. In particular, estimates of the reaction function slope will tend to be 
biased. Intuitively, authorities hitting the limits give the false impression of deliberately setting their 
policies independently of their competitors (in either tax or yardstick competition frameworks), while 
being in reality constrained by fiscal limitations to do so. 
Luna et al. (2007) examine Tennessee counties' option sales taxes between 1975 and 1999, with county 
tax rates being legally constrained by a state cap of 2.25% in the 1975-1984 window, and of 2.75% in 
the rest of the period. They show that county sales tax rates generally increased over time, with all 95 
counties having positive tax rates and about half of them being capped at the maximum rate in 1984, 
and about 20% of them reaching the higher bound by 1999. To examine the role of economic and 
political factors in the decision to raise sales tax rates and eventually end up against the tax limit, they 
use a duration model that uses as the key variable the spell of time spent below the tax cap. To allow 
for neighborhood influences on the probability that a county ends in the corner solution, they use two 
variables. The first is the average sales tax rate of contiguous counties weighted by population, based 
on the assumption that larger neighboring counties are more likely to have an impact on the county's 
tax rate. The second is a dummy variable that takes a value of one for a border county and a value of 
zero for an interior county, with the expectation that border counties will keep their local tax rates low 
to limit cross--border shopping arising from combined state and local sales tax differentials. While their 
survival analysis does not reveal any significant influence from neighboring counties, they 
acknowledge the complexity of a simultaneous spatial tax competition empirical model and call for 
further research in this area. 
Wu and Merriman (2011) use the introduction of a simplified local telecommunications tax in Illinois 
in 2003 to examine municipalities' tax setting choices in the subsequent years. The new system allowed 
municipalities to choose a tax rate between 0 and 6 percent of the gross charge for telecommunications 
purchased at retail. Between 2003 and 2008, the number of municipalities that did not set the tax 
dropped slightly, while the number of municipalities that were capped at the top rate increased 
significantly. When analyzing the determinants of the evolution of those tax rates over time, they find 
evidence of inertia effects in the sense that municipalities that had a zero tax rate at the time of 
introduction of the tax tended not to set positive tax rates subsequently, and the municipalities that were 
capped at the maximum rate tended not to revert from there. They do find evidence of neighboring 
effects, though: once allowing for inertial behavior of corner solution authorities, high or increasing tax 
rates in adjacent municipalities are estimated to make own tax increases more likely. 
Di Porto and Revelli (2013) explicitly model a spatial process in local tax policies in the presence of 
centrally imposed fiscal limitations. In order to investigate the effect of those limitations on the 
intensity of intergovernmental competition, they take the conventional empirical model of the fiscal 
reaction function - the spatial lag specification that does not account for corner solutions at the tax 
limits - as the benchmark, and implement three empirical approaches to the analysis of spatially 
dependent limited tax policies: 1) a Bayesian spatial approach for censored dependent variables; 2) a 
Tobit corner solution model augmented with a spatial lag; 3) a spatial discrete hazard model focusing 
on the corner solution outcomes.5 Based on an empirical application to provincial vehicle taxation in 
Italy, they find that explicitly allowing for corner solutions generated by tax limitations unveils a 
significantly stronger spatial dependence process than when employing conventional approaches. They 
also show that the performance and usefulness of those modelling approaches depend on their ability to 
capture the specific features of the institutional framework under consideration, the nature of the state-
local government structure and the binding intensity of the tax limitations in force. 
 
2.4 The other side of the budget: spatial interaction in public expenditures 
 
Along the continuing empirical work on tax competition, attention has recently turned back to the 
expenditure side of the budget and to the spatial analysis of various types and categories of local 
spending. Based on French municipalities' data, Foucault et al. (2008) find evidence of opportunistic 
strategic behavior in current and investment expenditure setting behavior, and Choumert and Cormier 
(2011) test for benefit spillovers among local authorities in the provision of urban parks and green 
spaces. Lundberg (2006), Werck et al. (2008) and Dalle Nogare and Galizzi (2011) explore spatial 
dependence in local spending on culture in different institutional settings. Rincke (2010) proposes a 
commuting-adjusted weighting scheme and shows the sensitivity of the results of estimation of a spatial 
lag model of local police spending in the US. Solé-Ollé (2006) models two distinct forms of spillovers: 
benefit spillovers from the provision of non-rival local public goods and crowding spillovers arising 
from the use of rival local facilities by non-residents. Based on cross-sectional data on over 2500 
Spanish local governments, estimation of an expenditure reaction function reveals that both types of 
spillovers are relevant. Stastna (2009) finds evidence of expenditure mimicking among local authorities 
in the Czech Republic as far as spending on housing and culture is concerned, while negative spatial 
interdependence for expenditures on industry, infrastructure and environmental protection is taken as a 
symptom of benefit spillovers making neighbors' expenditures on those services substitutes for own 
spending. Agostini et al. (2010) use panel data on 86 rural Chinese administrative villages and find 
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evidence that per capita spending on public projects in neighboring villages significantly increases 
spending in the home village, and argue that transition to democracy stimulates those neighborhood 
effects. Ermini and Santolini (2010) investigate the spatial pattern of general and categorical public 
expenditures in a cross-section of Italian municipalities. Since they do not find any evidence of 
opportunistic or electoral motivation in spending determination, they attribute the observed spatial 
pattern to spillovers making municipal services complementary, and possibly to the presence of explicit 
forms of intermunicipal cooperation and partnership. However, in a subsequent analysis based on a 
panel dataset for roughly the same sample of municipalities, Bartolini and Santolini (2011) show that 
explicit consideration of a number of electoral and institutional constraints on mayors allows to identify 
different behavioral patterns that are consistent with the idea of strategic mimicking due to yardstick 
competition. 
A strand of the literature focuses on decentralized welfare spending. Dahlberg and Edmark (2008) test 
the race to the bottom hypothesis on benefit levels in Sweden. Birkelof (2009, 2010) studies Swedish 
municipalities' expenditures on services directed to people with major and long-term functional 
disabilities, and finds that spatial dependence in spending per capita on those services decreases 
substantially after the introduction of an equalization grant mechanism that relies on standardized 
provision costs. Fiva and Rattso (2006) and Fiva (2009) provide evidence of strategic interaction 
among Norwegian municipalities in setting benefit levels. Moscone and Knapp (2005), Moscone et al. 
(2007), and Moscone (2011) find evidence of spatial dependence in mental health and learning 
disabilities by the English local authorities, while Costa-Font and Pons-Novell (2007) and Costa-Font 
and Moscone (2008) examine the spatial pattern of regional public health expenditure in Spain. 
Finally, recent studies go beyond the conventional single-equation approach and introduce spatial 
aspects in the overall fiscal policy-making process of local authorities. Hauptmeier et al. (2008) derive 
from a theoretical fiscal competition framework a two-equation empirical model composed of 
structural reaction functions for capital tax rate and a public input, and implement it on a panel dataset 
for municipalities in the German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. The empirical analysis reveals a 
complex pattern of interactions across the two simultaneously set policy instruments, and suggests a 
rather flexible form of competition among local jurisdictions to attract mobile capital. Geys and Revelli 
(2011) study the tax mix determination process - that is, the simultaneous choice of the vector of local 
tax rates in the presence of multiple own sources of revenue - using Flemish municipalities' panel data, 
and test for spatial dependence in the residuals from estimation of a system of reduced-form tax 
revenue-share equations. They find that the observed spatial pattern in the local tax mix of Flemish 
authorities is driven almost entirely by the fact that contiguous municipalities have similar 
socioeconomic structures influencing their tax mix choices in similar directions. Allers and Elhorst 
(2011) use an extended version of the LES (linear expenditure system) with policy interaction effects to 
simultaneously estimate interactions in both taxation and (six) different spending categories among 
Dutch municipalities. They explicitly derive an extended version of the LES that accounts for spatial 
dependence and interjurisdictional differences in unit costs of public services from a formal social 
welfare maximization problem subject to the jurisdiction's budget constraint. Their estimates of the 
spatial interaction parameters tend to be higher than those obtained in conventional single equation 
models that introduce a spatial lag in an ad hoc fashion. Finally, Fletcher and Murray (2006) analyze 
the overall structure of US states' sales taxes - including tax base definition and needy consumers and 
business exemptions. The interstate tax base definition pattern that emerges is not a purely geographic 
one, but appears to be driven by states' economic and fiscal dimensions. 
 
2.5 Local government efficiency, popularity and the media 
 
Whether the revenue or the expenditure side of the budget is considered, though, yardstick competition 
remains among the most popular explanations of why decentralized governments interact with each 
other and tend to exhibit interdependent policy outcomes. In fact, empirical applications of political 
economy models are where the most innovative attempts have been made to unveil the network of 
dependence and to measure the performance of decentralized governments. 
In a way, yardstick competition owes its popularity to the fact that Tiebout mobility seems patently 
unrealistic in a number of countries (particularly in Europe), while information spillovers across 
localities are easier to believe in, and are well documented. Moreover, an unpleasant aspect of the 
Tiebout model for empirical researchers employing spatial econometrics techniques is that household 
sorting into locations based on heterogeneous tastes for local public services is bound almost by 
definition to yield no clear empirical prediction in terms of spatial dependence of tax and public service 
bundles. 
Recents tests of the yardstick competition hypothesis have proceeded along two parallel ways. On the 
one hand, researchers have employed increasingly sophisticated measures of local government 
performance and checked their degree of correlation along geographic as well as more imaginative 
dimensions, such as deeper investigations of the channels (the media) through which information spills 
over. Recent empirical applications to Belgium (Geys, 2006), England (Revelli, 2007), and Norway 
(Revelli and Tovmo, 2007; Bruns and Himmler, 2011) use various measures of efficiency in local 
provision of public services and point to the potentially important role played by information spill-
overs and local media networks in affecting the spatial pattern of local government performance. On 
the other hand, Vermeir and Heyndels (2006), Bosch and Solé-Ollé (2007), Revelli (2008) and Dubois 
and Paty (2010) follow the yardstick voting approach, and estimate vote or re-election equations that 
allow for an effect from own as well as from neighboring authorities' tax and public service 
performance indicators on the popularity of incumbent governments. In some of those works, the 
neighborhood concept is enlarged to embrace the role of the media structure (Revelli, 2008) or of 
similarity in terms of demographic characteristics that transcend purely geographical patterns (Dubois 
and Paty, 2010). 
 
3. Recent developments 
 
While the above section shows how lively the empirical literature on fiscal interaction has been in the 
past few years, the turn of the decade has marked a change of pace in applied research. Such abrupt 
acceleration is characterized by a change of focus of empirical work as well as the adoption of novel 
spatial econometric techniques. I outline the most recent research in this area in the two following 
sections, dealing respectively with the call for more general spatial econometrics models than the 
traditional spatial error and spatial lag ones (the so-called spatial Durbin model), and the deep criticism 
of structural spatial econometrics approaches stemming from the experimental paradigm concept. 
 
3.1 Specification and interpretation issues 
 
As argued by Elhorst (2010a), spatial econometrics has gone through a phase of substantial renovation 
in recent years, particularly thanks to some notable methodological contributions. The two most 
important novel aspects for spatial econometric applications are the call for the adoption of general 
spatial models such as the spatial Durbin one in place of the conventional spatial error and spatial lag 
ones, and the urge to focus on the direct, indirect and total marginal effects of the exogenous variables 
in the model, where those effects are indeed a function of the estimated autoregressive coefficient, but 
vary depending on the location of the observations (LeSage and Pace, 2009).6 
First, the spatial Durbin model allows both neighbors' key policy variables (W) and their relevant 
determinants (WX) to be included in an unrestricted form in the model of the determination of own 
policies: 
 W  X  WX  u   #   
        (5) 
 
According to Elhorst (2010a; 2010b), the main advantage of the spatial Durbin model relative to more 
restrictive specifications is that it produces unbiased coefficient estimates also if the true data-
generating process is a spatial lag or spatial error model. Recent empirical applications to local public 
finance contexts based on the spatial Durbin model are Elhorst and Freret (2009) and Beer and Riedl 
(2011). 
Second, the recent spatial econometrics literature puts forward a slightly different interpretation of the 
key coefficients in spatial dependence models than it has been usually done in applied empirical work. 
It is stressed that the most important information that can be drawn from the estimation of spatial 
models is contained in the direct, indirect and total marginal effects of the exogenous variables in the 
model. In fact, those effects are a function of the estimated autoregressive coefficient -   in equation 
(3), or   in equation (5) - and depend on the location of the observations (LeSage and Pace, 2009). In 
particular, the direct and indirect marginal effects from a spatial lag and a spatial Durbin specification 
are based on: 
E  MX  INT  W1X   #   
        (6) 
E  MX  WX  INT  W1X  WX
     (7) 
 
In the spatial lag model, the direct effects of the x it  vector variables (x irt,r  1, . . . ,R) on it  
(it/x irt  Mi, ir ) depend on the diagonal elements of the M  matrix, and capture the feedback 
loops from a change in x irt  on jt  (j  i) and back on it , with Mi, i  1 . In practice, the 
magnitude of the direct effects depends on the position of units in space and on their degree of 
                                                          
6LeSage and Domiguez (2011) stress the usefulness of spatial models - and of the spatial Durbin model 
connectivity with other units as determined by W, and differs across units. Typically, average direct 
effects are based on the mean of the trace of matrix M , or they are computed for selected, relevant 
observations. 
Conversely, the indirect effects it/x jrt  Mi, jr  j  i  rely on the off-diagonal elements of 
matrix M  and arise from the fact that a change in variable r in a single unit can potentially affect all 
other units. Average indirect effects are based on the mean of the row (or column) sums of matrix M , 
and quantify the impact of a change in x jrt  in all other units on it  (or of a change in x irt  at a particular 
location on all other jt ) via parameter  . Since the average row sum (total impact to an observation) 
and the average column sum (total impact from an observation) are equal, there is no practical 
difference in following either of the two approaches, though they have a different interpretation 
(LeSage and Pace, 2009, p. 37). A similar approach for computing direct and indirect marginal effects 
is followed in the spatial Durbin model, with the difference that a change in x jrtj  i  affects it  via 
the two parameters   and  r  (Elhorst, 2010). 
 
3.2 Discontinuities at borders 
 
However, a somewhat deeper criticism to conventional spatial econometrics approaches has been 
raised in a number of recent papers (Pinkse and Slade, 2010; McMillen, 2010; Gibbons and Overman, 
2012) and concerns the weakness of conventional spatial econometric methods in terms of 
identification and causality. The criticism is based on the so-called experimental paradigm and stems 
from the need to identify causal effects in spatial models in roughly the same way as this is done in the 
other fields of applied economic research. In particular, it is argued that the standard spatial 
econometric models - including the spatial Durbin one - would be extremely difficult to distinguish 
from one another empirically, given that they all have virtually the same reduced form, where the 
variable of interest is a function of various spatial lags of the exogenous variables. As a result, the best 
one could obtain from those parametric specifications that model the entire spatial dependence 
structure up to single multiplicative coefficients would be some rough idea of the sign and strength of 
the spatial dependence in a variable of interest, something that would not represent an overwhelming 
gain relative to the insight provided by plain tests of spatial autocorrelation. This discouraging view is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
in particular - in empirical public choice analyses. 
further worsened if one considers that consistent estimation of the  parameter vector relies on the 
empirical model being correctly specified and the variables in X being strictly exogenous, and that, in 
the absence of compelling theoretical reasons, the spatial weights matrix X is usually chosen in an 
arbitrary way (Gibbons and Overman, 2012). 
While various directions for future research in spatial econometrics have been recently proposed to 
overcome the above weaknesses, the one that is most relevant for local public finance applications is 
the need to look for exogenous variations in spatially coded variables. Exogenous variation in spatially 
linked locations should be able to overcome the physiological lack of valid spatial instruments when 
the matrix W is (arguably in most applications) incorrectly specified, and allow identification of the 
causal impact of policy changes in one jurisdiction on other jurisdictions. The search for an exogenous 
variation in space seems a reasonable empirical approach both when the researcher is interested in 
explicitly (and ambitiously, in the light of the above criticism) recovering the actual degree of policy 
interaction - i.e., estimating a fiscal reaction function with a spatial lag or spatial Durbin specification - 
and when, in a more realistic and perhaps illuminating way, the fundamental research design consists in 
estimating the sensitivity of economic and political conditions in a jurisdiction to the fiscal policies set 
in the wider neighborhood within which jurisdictions are plausibly spatially linked. This means, for 
instance, testing whether business location, employment or election results in a locality are affected by 
tax and expenditure policies in nearby localities, where identification of the effects of the latter is 
bound to require some exogenous spatial variation that most likely arises from institutional aspects and 
reforms. 
Recent public finance approaches that deal more or less explicitly with those criticisms and tackle the 
fiscal competition issue with identification and causality set at centre stage are Lyytikainen (2012), 
Reback (2011), Agrawal (2011), and Eugster and Parchet (2011). In various ways, these papers exploit 
exogenous spatial variations or discontinuities in order to identify fiscal competition phenomena. 
Lyytikainen (2012) tests for property tax competition among local governments in Finalnd by 
estimating a fiscal reaction function with an IV approach . The interesting innovation in that paper is 
the use of a property tax reform occurred in the year 2000 that increased the statutory lower limits to 
the property tax rates. For authorities that were setting in 1999 a lower tax rate than the new limit, the 
reform generates exogenous tax rate changes (forced increases) that can be used as instruments for 
changes in neighbors' tax rates in a spatial lag specification. In particular, since Lyytikainen (2012) 
realizes that corner solutions arise when authorities are against the new lower limit in the year 2000, he 
chooses to restrict his attention to municipalities for which the new lower limit is not binding (i.e., 
dropping the corner solution observations), and to estimate the response of the authorities in that 
smaller sub-sample to the tax rate changes in all neighboring authorities, whether or not they are 
constrained by the new limit, using as instruments the predicted imposed tax rate increases for corner 
solution observations. The empirical analysis conducted on the differenced cross-section 1999-2000 
reveals virtually no response of unconstrained authorities - i.e., authorities setting rates well above the 
limit - to tax rate changes in the neighborhood. In general, the idea of exploiting the centralized 
tightening of the lower tax limits is novel and interesting. However, simply dropping the corner 
solution observations - i.e., the low tax authorities - is not without consequences, especially if those low 
tax authorities are the most sensitive to tax competition pressures, and high tax authorities that the 
analysis focusses on are the least, due, say, to agglomeration forces. 
Reback (2011) uses a cross-state-border instrumental variable strategy in order to overcome the 
difficulties that arise when searching for valid instruments for neighboring authorities' policies in a 
spatial lag specification. In a two-tiered - state and local - system as the US, the idea is to look at the 
response of the policy of a local authority located, say, in state A, to the policies of neighboring 
authorities located along the border in state B, using districts located in state B at a long enough 
distance from the cross-state border as instruments. Since similar districts in the same state tend to be 
similarly affected by state policies, and state policies show a large variance across states, inner 
locality's fiscal policies are likely to be highly correlated with close to the border localities and 
therefore constitute relevant instruments. While the idea is interesting, the model still seems to suffer 
from an arbitrary definition of neighborhood and to a somewhat ad hoc specification imposing 
exclusion restrictions - own and out-of-state inner localities' policies - in the fiscal reaction function. 
Still, exploiting the patterns produced by multi-tiered government structures is definitely a promising 
field for further research. 
Agrawal (2011) is an interesting attempt at estimating the local tax gradient, that is the effect of 
distance of a locality from a state border on the local sales tax rate in the presence of discontinuities at 
borders due to state sales tax rate differences. In particular, Agrawal follows a sort of regression 
discontinuity design. The treatment variable is not just the dichotomous state border discontinuity, but 
the actual size of the notch, that is the difference in sales tax rates among contiguous states. In practice, 
he models a flexible, non-linear relationship between the combined district-county sales tax rate in a 
locality and the distance from the nearest state border, and interacts the composite distance terms with 
the positive (own state setting a higher tax than the neighboring state) or negative (own state setting a 
lower tax than the neighboring state) notch size. While not directly estimating a tax reaction function, 
he finds indirect evidence of tax competition: distance to the border is a significant determinant of local 
option sales taxes, and local tax rates close to the border tend to partially offset interstate tax 
differences. 
Finally, Eugster and Parchet (2011) aim at identifying tax competition among localities in Switzerland 
by exploiting discontinuities in voter preferences at language borders. Based on local outcomes of 
federal referenda on fiscal issues, they first show large differences in preferences and even discrete 
jumps in voting at language borders. They next show that localities that are far from the language 
border exhibit great differences too in local income tax rates (multipliers), with French-speaking 
localities setting significantly higher taxes on income than German-speaking ones. However, localities 
that are close to the border set similar fiscal policies irrespective of the language side of the border they 
find themselves. The authors interpret the smoothing of tax policies close to the border (a tax gradient) 
as driven by the mobility of taxpayers and their threat to relocate, with the tax differential approaching 
zero in spite of the difference in culture. While the authors exclude a yardstick competition force 
driving such convergence at the border, it remains unexplained how cross-border mobility can be so 
high in the presence of such large cultural differences. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
Spatial econometrics methods have been extensively applied to the analysis of decentralized fiscal 
policy-making in the past two decades, with most research focussing on the investigation of spatial 
patterns arising from various forms of competition among local authorities. This chapter has reviewed 
the several contributions in the spatial analysis of local government data that have appeared since the 
publication of the first edition of the Handbook of Fiscal Federalism (2006) - over seventy fresh 
empirical works - with the aim of evaluating the advancements that have been made since then in the 
knowledge and understanding of interjurisdictional competition phenomena. The impressive number 
and diversity of empirical works that have investigated intergovernmental fiscal competition 
phenomena in the most recent years suggests that spatial fiscal interaction remains a core topic of 
applied research in fiscal federalism research. Scholars in this field have tackled a number of important 
issues, including conventional tax competition for mobile resources, spillovers from expenditures on 
local public services, and interdependence arising from imitation, policy diffusion and yardstick 
competition. Particularly interesting are the recent attempts to pursue new and more convincing 
empirical approaches that are able to deliver a causal interpretation of the estimated effects, based on 
careful recognition of institutional aspects (tax and expenditure limitations, exogenous policy changes 
at administrative borders) playing a crucial role in local government policy-making. This line of 
research seems the best suited to respond to the mounting dissatisfaction with mechanical applications 
of spatial econometric methods to the analysis of local government data, and the most promising in 
terms of potential for identification and proper interpretation of the undeniable role of space in the 
determination of decentralized fiscal policies. 
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